Tuesday 18 February 2014

Madhabs are characterised by differences of opinions?

Madh-habs are basically characterized by differences of opinions more than they are characterized by uniformity and agreement and this is why we should not follow any madh-hab.”

Before we can agree or disagree with the above statement, let us analyse the statement further.  The statement implies that the concept of ‘differences of opinions’ is bad while the concept of ‘uniformity and agreement’ is good.  The statement also implies that the main characteristic of the madh-hab is this implied negative concept of ‘differences of opinions’.  Lastly, by the logical assumption that we should embrace the good, we should reject the concept of madh-habs.

Let us tackle first the concepts of ‘uniformity and agreement’ and ‘differences of opinions’.  In the Qur’an[1], there are several verses referring to mankind’s nature of holding different opinions and divergent views such as 2:213, 2:253, 5.48, 11:118, 16:92-93, 17:84, 21:92-93, 22:67 and 23:52-54.  These verses imply that it is part of God’s will and plan that mankind should hold divergent views.  (Abou El-Fadl , 2001, p. 29) One verse in particular holds an interesting implication for our discussion:
“…Unto every one of you have We appointed a [different] law and way of life.[2] And if God had so willed, He could surely have made you all one single community: but [He willed it otherwise] in order to test you by means of what He has vouchsafed unto you.  Vie, then, with one another in doing good works!  Unto God you all must return; and then He will make you truly understand all that on which you were wont to differ.” (Qur’an, 5:58)

In Asad’s commentary, he picked up on the Qur’an’s specific use of the word ‘shir’ah’ (body of laws) and ‘minhaj’ (way of life).  Both terms imply something that varies and changes ‘in accordance with the exigencies of time and of each community’s cultural development’ (Asad, 1980, p. 153).  The history of law, including Islamic law, shows this to be true as people confront new circumstances and therefore need to address those circumstances.  For example, taking the early development of Islamic law, circumstances forced Umar al-Khattab r.a. to suspend the execution of the law of theft during the famine even though it was never suspended during the Prophet’s (s.a.w.) nor Abu Bakr’s (r.a.) time.  It led to the legal precedence of suspending such law during extra-ordinary and/or very difficult and trying circumstances in Islamic law and later to the development of the maqasid al-Shari’ah[3].  Therefore, the choice of the words used by the Qur’an is significant because it implies flexibility and adaptability which is required in order to accommodate different circumstances – not only major ones as in the case of the earlier quoted example but also individual circumstances – and also differences in opinions.

It is not just the Qur’an that acknowledges the reality of the differences in views and opinions.  Citing Al-Juwayni, Abou El-Fadl (2001, p. 10) noted the long-standing tradition of disputation and disagreement that could be traced back to the time of the Companions.  There was also a famous hadith, though its authenticity is disputed, that ‘disagreement of the ummah is a source of mercy’ (Abou El-Fadl, 2001).  Imam Malik r.a. resisted having his book, al-Muwatta’, imposed as the uniform law of the land because he upheld the view that there was no single juristic tradition/school amongst the many which have formed that have an exclusive claim to the truth.  This was so because each school based their legal opinions on only part of the entire corpus of knowledge handed down by the various Companions who settled in the various lands (Abou El-Fadl, 2001; Philips, 2006).  Each of the scholars in the various schools was exercising his/her ijtihad based on their knowledge and as the famous hadith in Sahih Muslim (Elias, 2012) goes:
Amr ibn Al-As reported: I heard the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, say, “If a judge makes a ruling, striving to apply his reasoning (ijtihad) and he is correct, then he will have two rewards; and if a judge makes a ruling, striving to apply his reasoning and he is mistaken, then he will have one reward.”
These various traditions in Islamic jurisprudence seem to indicate that the Islamic jurisprudential tradition does embrace the idea of diversity in opinions.  The Islamic jurisprudential tradition, which has striven hard to be true to the Qur’an and Sunnah, would not embrace something that runs counter to them.  Thus the idea of diversity in opinions does not run counter to these sacred sources and cannot possibly be bad.

The second assumption in the statement is that madh-habs are characterised by ‘differences of opinion’.  Is this true? First, we need to understand what a madh-hab is.  A madh-hab is a school of Islamic legal thought.  The key word here is ‘legal thought’.  Benard G. Weiss (2006, p. 22) states:
“It is a presupposition of Muslim juristic thought that the law of God has not been given to human beings in the form of a ready-made code.  Law is not sent down from heaven as a finished product.  Rather, it is something that human jurists must elaborate on the basis of textual sources.”
Again the idea here is that the jurists have to exercise their ijtihad in interpreting the textual sources of the Qur’an and Sunnah in expressing the legislation/law.  Ijtihad means hard work and each mujtahid has the responsibility to exert himself/herself to the issue even if it has already been done by others and form his/her own opinion (Weiss, 2006, p. 132).  Therefore the mujtahidis, and by extension the madh-habs they identify with and/or belong to, derive their authority from their ability to interpret the text through their hard work (Abou El-Fadl, 2001; Weiss, 2006) and due to human fallibility[4], there is the possibility of diversity of interpretation for a single issue.  Even within a single madh-hab, there is a diversity of opinions on the various issues.  Ibn Rushd in his book Bidayat al-Mujtahid wa Nihayat al-Muqtasid (1994) describes the various ikhtilaf and noted the reasons for these differences in detail.  Thus, the statement that madh-habs are characterised by differences of opinions does have some validity.

In order to understand why these differences of opinions (ikhtilaf) arise, we need to understand the methodology which the mujtahidis and the madh-habs use to interpret the sacred texts of the Qur’an and Sunnah.   The Qur’an and Sunnah are the two primary sources of Islamic law.  However, while the Qur’anic text is agreed upon, the Sunnah is not.  Even with the Qur’an, differences occur in interpreting its text.  For example, in the case of a text in the form of a command there are differences of opinion as to whether it becomes an obligation or a recommendation and similarly in the case of a text of proscription (Ibn Rushd, 1994).  As for the Sunnah, Yusuf (1996) and Duderija (2012) made the differentiation between the Sunnah and hadiths.  Both these authors emphasised that the Sunnah refers to the practices (aml) as opposed to the hadiths which is the documentation of the practices.  Simply put, as generations passed, there is a growing reliance on the hadiths to remember the Sunnah.  However, given that documentation can be falsified, there arises different ways to authenticate the hadiths – two main methodologies are those of the hadith scholars who look at the isnad and matan to prove the ‘soundness’ of a hadith as its authenticity and those of the legal theologists (usuliyyun) who look at the tawatur (the multiple channels of transmission) of the hadith to provide certainty of its authenticity.  These different methodologies, combined with the different methodologies in interpreting the text (matan) of the hadiths, naturally give rise to differences in opinions and judgement[5].  These differences of opinions and judgement have ensured a rich Islamic legal tradition and heritage, manifested by the madh-habs, which is not only able to respond to new issues but also to look at old issues with new eyes/insight[6].  Therefore, even though the madh-habs are characterised by the differences of opinions, it is a positive development within the Islamic legal tradition that allows people to adopt an opinion suited to their circumstances rather than be rigidly bound by a single, uniform code of law which impose hardship upon the people because it is not suited for their circumstances. 


Finally, we come to the crux of the statement, i.e. we should not follow the madh-habs because they are characterised by differences of opinions.  We have shown that though the madh-habs are characterised by differences of opinions, differences of opinions do not necessarily have a negative connotation and within the Islamic legal tradition, these differences are seen as a mercy for the Ummah made up of diverse communities and individuals.  So the issue of following madh-habs or otherwise should not be decided according to whether the madh-habs are rife with differences of opinions but instead we need to understand what it means to follow a madh-hab.  As mentioned before, a madh-hab is a school of legal thought.  Simply put, if we take out the current concept of madh-habs being defined by the four major schools and perhaps the salafi and ahl-hadiths, a madh-hab represents the opinions of a learned scholar.

It is inescapable that a practising Muslim is always bound by a madh-hab.  A child learning from his/her parents follows the parents’ school of thought and if he is sent to study under a teacher, then she/he is following her/his teacher’s opinions, i.e. his madh-hab.  As she/he grows older and learns from more than one teacher, he/she may then be able to understand better and formulate his/her own choices from the various different opinions…at this stage, he/she is known as a muqallaf until he reaches the stage where he/she has the necessary skills to be a mujtahid whereupon he/she is now no longer bound by the opinions of those more knowledgeable than himself/herself.  Rather than being bound, the learned mujtahid can now engage in the process and becomes one of the contributors.

One of the implications of rejecting the following the madh-habs is that we are rejecting the Islamic jurisprudential tradition with its wealth of knowledge built up through the centuries.  It is as if we are cutting down the tree with its branches, leaves and fruits in order to ‘go back to the roots’.   A gardener who wants to grow his own tree by grafting the ‘roots’ needs to be equipped with the proper skills.  Similarly in the case of the person rejecting following the madh-habs, he needs to be equipped with the necessary skills to interpret the sources and form his own opinion.  Unfortunately, this is not the case of the majority of us.  What is therefore obligatory upon us is to strive to increase our knowledge and strive to reach this level knowledge and skill if we can but until then, we should honour the efforts of the mujtahidis and our ancestors who have built the Islamic legal traditions by keeping faith with our teachers.

Reference:
Abou El-Fadl, K., 2001. Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women. England, U.K: Oneworld Publication Limited.
Abou El-Fadl, K., 2006.  The Search for Beauty in Islam. U.S.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Asad, M., 1980. The Message of the Qur’an. Gibraltar: Dar al-Andalus Limited.
Duderija, A., 2012. Evolution in the Concept of Sunnah during the First Four Generations of Muslims in Relation to the Development of the Concept of an Authentic HadÄ«th as based on Recent Western Scholarship. Arab Law Quarterly, 26, pp. 393-437.
Elias, A.A., 2012. Daily Hadith Online. [online] Available at: http://www.dailyhadithonline.com/2012/02/10/hadith-on-fiqh-a-judge-who-makes-sincere-ijtihad-is-still-rewarded-even-if-he-is-wrong/ [Accessed 26 November 2013].
Hallaq, W., 1999.  The authenticity of Prophetic Hadith: A Pseudo-problem. Studia Islamica, 99, pp. 75-90.
Ibn Rushd, 1994. The Distinguished Jurist’s Primer/Bidayat al-Mujtahid wa Nihayat al-Muqtasid. Translated from Arabic by I.A.K. Nyazee. Reading, U.K.: Garnet Publishing Limited.
Philips, A.A.B., 2006. The Evolution of Fiqh: Islamic Law and the Madh-habs. Saudi Arabia: International Islamic Publishing House.
Weiss, B.G., 2006. The Spirit of Islamic Law. Georgia, U.S.: The University of Georgia Press. (Paperback ed.)
Yusuf, S.M., 1996. The Sunnah – Its Development and Revision. In: P.K. Koya, ed. 1996. Hadith and Sunnah: Ideals and Realities. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Islamic Book Trust, pp. 103-128.





[1] This paper will use Asad’s translation of the Qur’an (Asad, 1980) for any Qur’anic references.
[2] The words ‘shir’ah’ or ‘shari’ah’ and ‘minhaj’ are translated into law and way of life respectively.
[3] This famous ruling was one of the first steps towards the formulation of the maqasid of the Shari’ah where the most essential category (al-darurat) of preserving human life (as in the time of the famine) triumphs over the other essential categories, in this particular case the category is the preservation of one’s wealth and property.
[4] Both Abou El-Fadl (2001) and Weiss (2006) discuss the implication of fallibility of the jurists (mujtahid) on fiqh (Islamic law).
[5] Though not touched in this paper, amongst the secondary sources such as Qiyas, ‘Urf, Ihtisan etc, the madh-habs have always differed in their preference for these secondary sources.
[6] One such issue that caught my attention was on spousal abuse.  Here, Abou El-Fadl (2006) gave a fresh perspective on the related verses and hadiths.

Monday 17 February 2014

Dangers of Qiyas without proper knowledge

This weekend, I had a discussion with a couple of friends regarding a Hadith about forbidding the filing of teeth, plucking of eyebrow and so forth.


There were some speculations as to whether it means whitening of the teeth and so on are also forbidden.  I stopped the speculations because of a few concerns I have with such a discussion:


1. Do we have enough knowledge to know whether the Hadith is muttawatur or ahad; and also sahih or hasan or daif?  


2.  Do we know the background of the Hadith - in what context it was said and the cause of it?  What is the underlying meaning?


3.  Were there other hadiths or verses of the Qur'an supporting or contradicting this one?  If contradicting, how do we reconcile them?


3.  When those are clarified, we then need to understand what is the 'basis' for making the qiyas (extrapolation) to other things such as whitening of the teeth etc?  What is the operative cause/reason for the qiyas?


4.  Could there be extenuating circumstances that may lead to different conclusion?  


5.  What is the impact of making the qiyas?  How wide ranging is it in terms of individual and community level?


 As I learn more about Islamic jurisprudence, the more cautious I become in these kinds of discussions.  Personally, I think we were not equipped to address the above points.  


For example, take the third point...what is the underlying reason for forbidding the filing of the teeth?  Is it because it is not healthy or because it is tempering with what God gave you or it is to beautify oneself or it is misrepresenting oneself to others?  And then we ask how do we know that the underlying reason can be applied to the other activities?


The danger is then that we apply the wrong reasoning and therefore the wrong qiyas.  In that case, we are misrepresenting what the Prophet s.a.w. intended.  And given that we didn't apply due diligence, we couldn't even say that we exercised our ijtihad.  Thus we fall into the danger of assuming a role of authority without being duly qualified for it. And in so doing, interpose our will over the Divine Will.


This little incident is just one example of how I realise, in my arrogant youth, I would have jumped to conclusions that could have had me assuming an authoritarian role in interpreting the Hadith and applying it willy nilly to what I saw fit.  Inshallah, I have learnt my lesson that my knowledge is too limited for such a task but that I should learn more towards equipping myself with the knowledge.


Wallahu 'alam.